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U.S. V. SCHULTZ
333 F.3d 393 (2002)
I. INTRODUCTION

For nearly ten years, Frederick Schultz, a New York antiquities
dealer and former president of the National Association of Dealers
in Ancient, Oriental and Primitive Art, successfully smuggled
antiquities out of Egypt, imported them into the United States and
sold them by defrauding purchasers.' However, on July 16, 2001,
Schultz was indicted in the United States for conspiring to receive
stolen Egyptian antiquities in violation of the National Stolen
Property Act (NSPA), pursuant to Law 117. 2 Law 117 vests in the
Egyptian government true ownership rights of antiquities
discovered in Egypt after 1983. 3 Schultz moved in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York to
dismiss the indictment.4 He contended that Law 117 does not
confer true ownership rights in the Egyptian government.5
Therefore, if the Egyptian government did not own the smuggled
' U.S. v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 396-98 (2nd Cir. 2003). See also Daniel W.
Eck, Patty Gerstenblith, Marilyn Phelan, InternationalCulturalProperty, 36
INT'L LAW. 607, 615 (2002).

2Schultz, 333 F.3d at 398. The NSPA, 18 U.S.C. § 2315 (2000), reads, in
pertinent part:
Whoever receives, possesses, conceals, stores, barters, sells,
or disposes of any goods, wares, or merchandise, securities, or
money of the value of $5,000 or more... which have crossed a
State or United States boundary after being stolen, unlawfully
converted, or taken, knowing the same to have been stolen,
unlawfully converted, or taken... [s]hall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both. Id. at
399.

Law 117 is an Egyptian ownership law enacted for the preservation of Egyptian
cultural heritage. It is an "ownership" law because it vests true ownership rights
in the Egyptian government. If an object is considered "stolen" under a national
ownership law, such as Law 117, the NSPA can be enforced pursuant to it. Id. at
398.
IId. at 395-96.

4 Id. at 400.

5Id.
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objects, they could not be stolen.6 The district court disagreed,
finding that Law 117 conferred ownership rights.7 The jury
subsequently found Schultz guilty and he received a sentence of
thirty-three months imprisonment. 8 On appeal, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's finding
and concluded that the objects at issue were "stolen" within the
meaning of the NSPA. 9
II. BACKGROUND

In 1991, Jonathan Parry, a British antiquities restorer, acquired
an ancient Egyptian sculpture of the head of Pharaoh Amenhotep
III. 10 He subsequently coated it with plastic so it would look like a
cheap souvenir and smuggled it out of Egypt. 1 Introduced to
Parry through a mutual friend, Frederick Schultz agreed to serve as
an agent for the sale of the sculpture.12 The two men endeavored
to create a false provenance, false labels and a fictional collection
("The Thomas Alcock Collection") for the purpose of defrauding
potential purchasers.' 3 Parry even restored the piece using
restoration methods of the 1920's to enable them to claim that the
piece had been exported from Egypt to Britain in the 1920's. 14
Unable to sell the sculpture, Schultz purchased it from Parry for
$800,000 and then resold it in 1992 to a private collector for $1.2
million.' 5
Three years later, the owner requested further
information regarding the provenance, after having learned that the
6id.

7 Id. at 401. The district court, based on testimony and evidence at a hearing,

determined that Law 117 vests true ownership rights in the Egyptian
government. Id.
8Schultz, 333 F.3d at 398.
9
1d. at 416.
'0Id. at 396.
1l Id.
12 id.
13Id. "Provenance" refers to the history of ownership of a valued object or
work of art or literature. MERRIAM
(IOth ed. 1995).
14 Schultz, 333 F.3d at 396.
15id.

WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY
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Egyptian government was searching for the sculpture. 16 Schultz
managed to successfully evade the request. 17 He and Parry then
became partners and continued to smuggle Egyptian antiquities
into both America and Britain for the purpose of selling them
under the false provenance and as part of "The Thomas Alcock
Collection."'' 8 They even acquired less valuable pieces for the
fictional collection to make it more believable. 19 During this
period, Schultz and Parry communicated regularly through letters
written in code or various languages, which indicated that they
were aware of the legal risk involved in their conduct.2 °
In 1992, Parry and his middleman, Farag, were reported to the
Egyptian authorities for dealing in antiquities. 21 They cleared their
names by bribing members of the Egyptian antiquities police and
even negotiated a deal with corrupt officers in which they received
antiquities in police possession in exchange for payment of the
officers' debts. 22 Parry acquired three antiquities through this
arrangement and sent them to Schultz. 23 Each had been marked
with an Egyptian government registry number, which Parry
partially obliterated. 24
In that same year, Parry purchased a limestone sculpture of a
striding figure from a group of Egyptian villagers.25 He
reassembled the piece, which had been found in parts, coated it in
plastic, painted it to look like a souvenir and successfully
smuggled it out of Egypt to Schultz in New York.26 Similar to
other antiquities acquired, Parry treated it with 1920's restoration
techniques and represented it as part of "The Thomas Alcock
Collection. 27 Schultz, unable to sell the sculpture, sent it to
16 id.
17 id.

18 Id.
20

Id. at 397.
Schultz, 333 F.3d at 398.

21

Id. at 397.

"

22 id.
23 id.
24 Id.
25 id.
26

27

Schultz, 333 F.3d at 398.
Id. at 397.
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However, it was

inexplicably never reclaimed.2 9
In 1994, Parry and Farag were again arrested and charged with
dealing in stolen antiquities.30 Parry's arrest, however, did not
deter Schultz and Parry from continuing to plan for new
acquisitions. 3 1 Later that year, they unsuccessfully attempted to
acquire three limestone "stelae," or inscribed slabs, discovered by
32
builders in Egypt, even though Parry was in custody in Britain.
In 2001, Schultz was indicted in the U.S. on "one count of
conspiring to receive stolen Egyptian antiquities that had been
transported in interstate and foreign commerce, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 371 . The indictment alleged that pursuant to Egyptian
Law 117, the antiquities at issue were "stolen" within the meaning
of the NSPA. 34 Enacted in 1983, Law 117, entitled "The Law on
the Protection of Antiquities," declares all antiquities discovered in
35
Egypt after 1983 to be the property of the Egyptian government.
The purpose of the law is to preserve the cultural heritage of
36
Egypt.
Schultz moved to dismiss the indictment on grounds that Law
117 is not truly an ownership law but merely one that restricts
exports.37 Following this contention, he argued that since the
Egyptian government did not own the antiquities at issue, they
could not be "stolen" within the meaning of the NSPA. 38 The U.S.
government, however, disagreed and asserted that under Law 117
the Egyptian government owned the antiquities at issue.39 In
response to Schultz's motion, the district court held an evidentiary
28 id.
29 Id.

Id. at 397-98.
"' id. at 398.
32 Schultz, 333 F.3d at 398.
30

13

14

Id. at 395.
Id. at 395-96. See supra note 2.

31 Id.
36

at 398-99.

Id. at 398.

31Id. at

401. Law 117 is considered an "ownership" law because it vests true

ownership rights in the Egyptian government. Id.
38 Schultz, 333 F.3d at 401.
39 Id. at 396.

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol13/iss2/9

4

Pond: U.S. v. Schultz 333 F.3d 393 (2002)

2003]

U.S. V. SCHULTZ

499

hearing to determine whether Law 117 is an ownership law. 4' The
government's fact witnesses, Dr. Gaballa Ali Gaballa, Secretary
General of Egypt's Supreme Council of Antiquities, and General
Ali El Sobky, Director of Criminal Investigations for the Egyptian
41
Antiquities Police, testified that Law 117 is an ownership law.
With regard to the law, Dr. Gaballa stated that there are no
circumstances in which a person who finds an antiquity in Egypt
may legally keep it. 42 Schultz's expert witness, Khaled Abou El
Fadl, professor of Islamic and Middle Eastern law at the
University of California at Los Angeles, opined that the law was
ambiguous and confusing. 3 However, his credibility was brought
into question on cross-examination, as it was determined that he
was neither licensed nor had ever practiced law in Egypt, or had
even read Law 117 prior to the suit. 44 Based on testimony and
evidence presented at the hearing, the district court found that Law
117 vests absolute and true ownership in the Egyptian government
of all antiquities discovered in Egypt after 1983. 4 5
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS

On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
determined the following: (1) Law 117 vests ownership rights in
the antiquities at issue in the Egyptian government; 46 (2) consistent
with the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit decision in U.S. v.
McClain,47 items dispossessed in violation of a foreign patrimony
law are "stolen" within the meaning of the NSPA; 48 (3) Law 117
40 Id. at 400. This hearing was held pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 26.1 which

reads, in pertinent part: "Issues of foreign law are questions of law, but in
deciding such issues a court may consider any relevant material or source,
including testimony, without regard to the Federal Rules of Evidence." Id. n.2.
41 Id. at 400-01.
42 Id. at 400.
41 Id. at 401.
44 Schultz, 333 F.3d at 401.
45 id.
46 Id. at 402.
4' 545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1977).
48 Schultz, 333 F.3d at 416.
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does not conflict with United States policy; 49 (4) the Cultural
Property Implementation Act of 1983, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2613
(CPIA), does not preclude application of the NSPA to antiquities
stolen in foreign countries; 50 (5) the common law definition of
"stolen" does not apply to the NSPA; 51 (6) the district court's
denial of Schultz's defense of mistake of American law was
proper;52 and (7) the conscious avoidance jury instruction did not
constitute plain error.53
A. Discussion

1. The Egyptian Government Owned the Antiquities at Issue
Pursuantto Law 117
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district
court's finding that Law 117 is an ownership law, rather than
merely a restriction on the export of antiquities. 54 The court
reasoned that the law governs exports out of Egypt in addition to
activities within the country. 55 Law 117 explicitly defines
"antiquity," provides procedures to be followed if one is in
possession of an object and enumerates the sanctions imposed on
those who violate the law. 56 Provisions such as licensure for
49

Id. at 407-08.

50 Id. at 409.
51id.

52

1Id. at 412.

53

1d. at 414.

Schultz, 333 F.3d at 401-02.
55Id. at 402.
14

56 Id. Law 117 defines "antiquity" as follows:

"An "antiquity" is any movable or immovable property that is
a product of any of the various civilizations or any of the arts,
sciences, humanities and religions of the successive historical
periods extending from prehistoric times down to a point one
hundred years before the present, so long as it has either a
value or importance archaeologically or historically that
symbolizes one of the various civilizations that have been
established in the land of Egypt or that has a historical relation
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foreign archaeological missions or circumstances in which the
government may donate antiquities to foreign museums reflects
the broad scope of the law. 57 The court determined that Law 117's
language is unambiguous and vests true ownership in the Egyptian
government. 58 From this reasoning, the Second Circuit concluded
that the Egyptian government owned the antiquities at issue.59
2. Consistent with McClain, the Antiquities Were "Stolen" Within
Meaning of the NSPA
Schultz argued that the Second Circuit should reject the court's
60
decision in U.S. v. McClain based on Second Circuit precedent.
The Second Circuit, however, found the reasoning of the McClain
court dispositive 6 1 and Schultz's interpretation of precedent
incorrect.62
Similar to Schultz, the defendants in McClain were convicted of
conspiring to violate the NSPA by importing artifacts protected by

to it, as well as human and animal remains from any such
period." Id. at 399.
"Sanctions and Penalties" under Law 117 provides:
"A person who unlawfully smuggles an antiquity outside the
Republic or participates in such an act shall be liable to a
prison term with hard labor and a fine of not less than 5,000
and not more than 50,000 pounds. A person who steals or
conceals a state-owned antiquity faces a prison term of three
to five years and a minimum fine of 3,000 pounds. A person
who removes or detaches, counterfeits an antiquity, or
unlawfully disposes of an antiquity faces a prison term of one
to two years and a minimum fine of 100 pounds. A person
who writes on, posts notices on, or accidentally defaces an
antiquity will be imprisoned three to twelve months and/or a
fine of 100 to 500 pounds." Id. at 400.
7Id. at 402.
58 Id.

59 id.
60

Schultz, 333 F.3d at 403.

61 id.
62

Id. at 405.
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a Mexican ownership law into the U.S. 63 In that case, the Fifth

Circuit determined that "a declaration of national ownership is
necessary before illegal exportation of an article can be considered
theft, and the exported article considered 'stolen' within the
meaning of the NSPA." 64 Upon analysis of the language and
purpose of the Mexican patrimony law, the Fifth Circuit
determined that it is an ownership law and concluded that the
objects at issue were stolen in violation of the NSPA. 65 The Fifth
Circuit noted that if the word "stolen" precluded coverage of items
illegally exported after the effective date of the Mexican patrimony
law, the Congressional objective of the NSPA, to protect owners
of stolen property, would be defeated.66 That is, the Mexican
government would be denied protection of the NSPA after it had
enacted a patrimony law for the specific purpose of protecting its
interests in artifacts.67
By contrast, Schultz cited several cases to argue. 6 8 First, in U.S.
v. Long Cove Seafood, Inc., the defendants were charged with
violating the NSPA when they took clams from the Long Island
Sound and sold them to area restaurants. 69 The government,
relying on a New York state statute, contended that the clams were
"stolen" as defined by the NSPA. 70 However, Long Cove is
distinguishable from Law 117 because the purpose of the New
York state ownership law is to regulate wildlife, rather than to
assert ownership rights. 7 1 Further, the New York statute provides
an exception for wildlife legally acquired and held in private
ownership, while no exceptions for private ownership of
63 Id. at 403.
64
id.
65 Id.

66

Schultz, 333 F.3d at 404.

67 Id.
68

69

Id.

at 405.
Id. See U.S. v. Long Cove Seafood, Inc., 582 F.2d 159 (1978).

Schultz, 333 F.3d at 405. New York Environmental Conservation Law 110105 provides, in relevant part: "The State of New York owns all fish, game,
wildlife, shellfish, crustacea and protected insects in the state, except those
legally acquired and held in private ownership." Id. See also Long Cove, 582
F.2d at 161.
71 Schultz, 333 F.3d at 405.
70
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antiquities are provided under Law 117.
The Second Circuit
determined that neither Long Cove nor other precedent cited by
Schultz supported his argument for rejecting McClain.73
In United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold (hereinafter
"Steinhardt"), 74 an Italian antiquity imported into the U.S. by
Steinhardt was subject to forfeiture on grounds that he had made
material misrepresentations on the customs form or, in the
alternative, violated the NSPA pursuant to an Italian ownership
law.75 The Supreme Court in Steinhardt concluded that the object
was subject to forfeiture because Steinhardt misrepresented that
the Italian object was from Switzerland on the customs form.7 6 As
the Court did not address the alternative issue regarding violation
of the NSPA, the Second Circuit found Schultz's reliance on
Steinhardtunpersuasive. 7
Similar to the McClain court, the Second Circuit concluded that
the antiquities smuggled into the U.S. by Schultz were owned by
the Egyptian government under Law 117 and "stolen" within the
meaning of the NSPA.78
3. Law 117 Does Not Conflict with United States Policy
Schultz also asserted that enforcement of Law 117 violated
United States policy not to enforce the export restrictions of
foreign nations. 79 The court of appeals first determined that
80
Schultz provided no evidence in support of this assertion.
Additionally, the court reasoned that this issue was irrelevant
because Law 117 is an ownership law, not an export-restriction
72 Id.

at 406. Law 117 provides an exception for private ownership of

antiquities if ownership or possession was established prior to 1983 (the
effective date of the law). Id. n.6.
71 Id. at 410.
74 184 F.3d 131 (2nd Cir. 1999).
71 Schultz, 333 F.3d at 406-407.
76 Id. at 407.
77 id.
" Id. at 404.
'9 Id. at 407.
80 Id.
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law. 8 1 This is supported by Dr. Gaballa's and General El Sobky's
testimony that the law provides sanctions for theft or concealment
Therefore, even if Schultz's
of antiquities within Egypt. 82
interpretation of American policy was correct, it was inapplicable
to the issue. 83 The court of appeals conceded that Law 117
that the scope
restricted exportation of antiquities but emphasized
84
restrictions.
export
to
of the law was not limited
4. The CPIA Does Not PrecludeApplication of the NSPA
Schultz also contended that enactment of the CPIA precluded
application of the NSPA to the antiquities he conspired to import
into the United States. 85 He argued that Congress intended the
CPIA to be the only mechanism through which the government
imported antiquities and other cultural property into the United
States.8 6 The court of appeals reasoned that neither the language
nor the legislative history of the Act supported Schultz's
interpretation. 87 The Senate Report on the CPIA stated that the
Act does not affect the NSPA.8 8 Schultz also argued that the CPIA
protects only those items stolen from specific places, such as
museums and institutions, rather than those stolen in violation of a
81

Schultz, 333 F.3d at 407.

82 Id.

84

Id. at 408.
Id. See supra note 55.

85

Schultz, 333 F.3d at 408. The CPIA, 19 U.S.C. § 2602(a), enables the United

83

States government to establish import restrictions on cultural property, at the
request of a signatory nation and subject to determinations by the President.
Before the U.S. will establish import restrictions under the CPIA, the President
must find that: "(1) the cultural patrimony of [the requesting nation] is in
jeopardy from the pillage of archaeological or ethnological materials [of that
nation]; (2) the requesting nation 'has taken measures.. to protect its cultural
patrimony;' (3) the import restrictions are necessary and would be effective in
dealing with the problem; (4) restrictions are in the 'general interest of the
international community."' Id. (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 2602(a)(1)(A-D) (2003)).
86

id.

87

Id.

88

Id. The Senate Report on the CPIA states, in relevant part, that laws

prohibiting theft, knowing receipt and transportation of stolen property in
interstate and foreign commerce do not affect the CPIA. Id.
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patrimony law. 89 The court disagreed, finding that the CPIA does
not state that importing stolen items from somewhere other than a
museum or cultural institution is legal. 90 Additionally, since the
CPIA is an import law while the NSPA is a criminal law, one can
potentially violate both if he imports an item into the United
States. 9 ' The court of appeals thus concluded that adoption of the
application of the NSPA to
CPIA by Congress does not preclude
92
antiquities stolen in foreign nations.
5. The Common Law Definition of "Stolen "Does Not Apply to the
NSPA
Schultz, citing U.S. v. Turley, asserted that application of the
common law definition of "stolen" was required to determine
whether the Egyptian objects at issue were protected under the
NSPA. 93 In Turley, the Supreme Court concluded that when a
federal criminal statute includes a common law term of established
meaning, but is silent as to its definition, the general practice is to
apply its common law meaning. 94 The court of appeals, however,
disagreed with Schultz's interpretation of Turley, reasoning that
the Court determined that "stolen" does not have an established
common law meaning. 95 The Supreme Court also found that the
statute at issue in Turley and the NSPA cover "a broader class of
crimes than those contemplated by the common law." 96 The court
of appeals concluded that it was not required to refer to the
whether the
common law definition of "stolen" to determine
97
issue.
at
antiquities
the
to
NSPA is applicable

89Id.
90 Id..

9'Schultz, 333 F.3d at 409. The CPIA is found in Title 19 ("Customs Duties")
while the NSPA is located in Title 18 ("Crimes and Criminal Procedure"). Id.
92 id.
93 Id.

See U.S. v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407 (1957).

94 Schultz, 333 F.3d at 409.
95Id.
96

Id. at 409-10.
97 Id. at 410.
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6. The District Court Properly Denied Schultz the Defense of
Mistake ofAmerican Law
Schultz also contended that the district court erred in denying
him the opportunity to present a defense of mistake of American
law. 98 He had intended to argue before the jury that he was
unaware that importing antiquities owned by the Egyptian
government, pursuant to Law 117, constituted a violation of the
NSPA. 9 9 Schultz conceded that the general rule is that ignorance
of the law is no defense to a criminal charge, but asserted
exceptions to the rule. 0 0 To support his argument, he cited three
Supreme Court cases and two federal appellate decisions in which
the defense of mistake of law was found to be proper.' 0' The
Second Circuit, however, found the decisions inapplicable to the
NSPA because they involved specific intent statutes. °2 Language
of specific intent, such as "willfully," reflects Congressional intent
to punish only those who had knowledge that their conduct was
unlawful. 0 3 There is, however, no language of specific intent
within the NSPA. 10 4 The only requirement for knowledge within
the NSPA is knowledge that the goods were "stolen, unlawfully
controverted, or taken.''1 0 5 From this reasoning, the court of
appeals concluded that a defendant might argue, as a defense, that
he did not know the objects at issue were stolen, but cannot escape

98 Id.
99 Id.

'0o
Schultz, 333 F.3d at 410.
at 410-11. Schultz cited Ratzlafv. U.S., 510 U.S. 135 (1994), Cheekv.

101Id.

U.S., 498 U.S. 192 (1991), Liparota v. U.S., 471 U.S. 419 (1985), U.S. v.
Lizarraga-Lizarraga,541 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1976), and U.S. v. Grigsby, 111

F.3d 806 (11th Cir. 1997). Id.

102 Schultz, 333 F.3d at 411. In U.S. v. Lizarraga-Lizarraga,541 F.2d 826 (9th

Cir. 1976), a Mexican statute provided that it was unlawful to "willfully" export
certain items to Mexico. Id. In Cheek v. U.S., 498 U.S. 192 (1991), a tax statute
utilized the term "willfully." Id. In Ratzlaf, an anti-structuring statute stated
that one must "willfully" violate the law to be subject to prosecution. Id. at 410.
103Id.

'04 Id. See supra note 2.
105 Id. See supra note 2.
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06
liability by asserting ignorance of the law.'
The court also determined that the statutes in the decisions cited
by Schultz were not intended to criminally penalize innocent
conduct.10 7 They were, therefore, inapplicable to Schultz because
his actions could not be construed as innocent. 10 8 The Second
Circuit reasoned that Schultz could not have believed that he was
acting lawfully when he conspired to smuggle antiquities out of
Egypt and defrauded potential purchasers. 10 9
Schultz also
continued to engage in this conduct even after Parry and Farag had
been arrested for dealing in antiquities. 110 Additionally, coded
letters sent regularly between Parry and Schultz, forged documents
and discussions of possible imprisonment indicated awareness of
their illicit conduct."' The court opined that even if Schultz had
been able to present his defense, it is unlikely that the jury would
have found it credible. 1 2 Also, in 1994, Schultz refused to comply
with the Turkish government when it requested the provenance for
objects in his gallery, which authorities believed were owned by
the Turkish government. 1 13 As a result, the Second Circuit
concluded that the district court did not err in refusing Schultz's
request to present a defense of mistake of American law.' 14
106Schultz,

333 F.3d at 409.

'0'Id. at 412. The court referred to U.S. v. Lizarraga-Lizarraga,541 F.2d 826
(9th Cir. 1976), in which the Ninth Circuit stated that the statute at issue was not
intended to criminally penalize innocent conduct. Id.
108 Id.
109Id.
110Id.

ii1Id.
Schultz, 333 F.3d at 412 n.12.
"3 Id. at n. 12.
114 Id. The court also upheld the district court's decision to allow government
112

witnesses to testify to their personal knowledge of Law 117 to rebut Schultz's
defense of mistake. Schultz contended that the district court erred in permitting
the government to procure testimony from five witnesses on the grounds that the
testimony was irrelevant. The witnesses were: James Romana and Edna
Russman, curators of the Brooklyn Museum of Art; Edmund Pillsbury, head of
the Kimball Museum; Black Woodruff, former employee of Schultz; and Betsy
Bryan, professor of Egyptology. Id. at 414-15. Schultz also asserted that the
district court's jury instruction was erroneous. Reasoning that a reasonable jury
could infer from the evidence presented at trial that Schultz had actual
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IV. CONCLUSION

For nearly ten years, Frederick Schultz, a prominent New York
dealer, successfully smuggled Egyptian antiquities out of the
country and into the United States. However, in 2001, he was
indicted in the U.S. for conspiring to receive stolen Egyptian
antiquities in violation of the NSPA. The district court determined
that the Egyptian government owned the objects under Law 117
and that the NSPA could be enforced pursuant to it. The jury
found Schultz guilty and he received a sentence of thirty-three
months imprisonment. The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that the smuggled
objects were "stolen" within the meaning of the NSPA.
The protection of art and antiquities from the dangers of illicit
15
trafficking is a matter of mounting international concern.'
Enactment of laws such as the NSPA, CPIA and Law 117 reflects
current efforts by the international community to combat this
problem by enforcing laws designed to preserve cultural
property. 1 6 The decision by the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in U.S. v. Schultz furthers the objective of protecting the
cultural heritage of Egypt, as well as serving as a deterrent to those
contemplating the illegal acquisition and sale of cultural property.
Beth Pond

knowledge of Law 117, the court of appeals determined that although the charge
could have been more precise, it did not constitute plain error. Id. at 412-14.
1 5 See generally Eck, et al., supra note 1.
116 Schultz, 333 F.3d at 416.
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